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ORGANIZING AT THE INTERSECTION OF LABOR
AND CIVIL RIGHTS: A CASE STUDY OF NEW
HAVEN
Dorian T. Warren & Cathy J. Cohent
The demand is increasing for a new type of union activism; one which
puts the community, and not the workplace, at the center of the struggle.!
This model recognizes that workers exist within a larger network of social
relationships which are dependent upon and supportive of union struggles.2
It insists on labor's recognition that people live much of their lives outside
of the workplace, bounded by certain identities which correlate to race,
ethnicity, gender, and sexuality. These identities, while neither originating
out of nor confined to the employment sector, often limit an individual's
choices in the workplace. This view is in direct contrast with the
traditional vision that labor struggles, while at times related to issues of
race, ethnicity, gender, and sexuality, should not be conflated, despite the
fact that these "limiting" classifications often determine an individual's type
of work and specific job.
In this article, we side with those who contend that when organizing
individuals, the multiple identities and social locations that structure and
determine all aspects of a worker's employment and living conditions must
be made central. 3 "Working" from this realization, the labor movement can
mobilize new constituencies and address the multiple issues that concern
t Dorian T. Warren is a graduate student in the Department of Political Science at
Yale University. Cathy J. Cohen is Professor of African and African American Studies and
Political Science at Yale University.
1. See AFL-CIO, CoMMuNrmEs AT WORK: A GUIDE TO RESTORING OUR RGHT TO
ORGANIzE: Tips, TOOLS AND RESOURCES FOR UNION AND COMMUNrrY ORGANIZERS (1997)
[hereinafter COMMUNrTIEs AT WORK]; Linda Chavez-Thompson, Communities at Work-
How New Alliances Are Restoring Our Right to Organize, 3 NEw LAB. F. 110 (1998).
2. Some scholars argue that unions have always involved their workers, and the
communities in which they live, in labor struggles. See Kim Scipes, Labor-Community
Coalitions: Not All They're Cracked up to Be, MONTHLY REv., Dec. 1991, at 34; see also
BUILDING BRIDGES: THE EMERGING GRASSROOTS COALMON OF LABOR AND COMMUNITY
(Jeremy Brecher & Tim Costello eds., 1990) [hereinafter BUILDING BRIDGES]; James A.
Craft, The Community As a Source of Union Power, 11 J. LAB. RES. 145 (1990).
3. See Tamara L. Jones, Union Institutionalism & Lesbian/Gay Organizing in District
Council 37, AFSCME, (1999) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
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these workers. It is this form of labor organization that may aid in the
survival of labor groups into the future and contribute to an improved
society for individuals.
Implementing this type of model, where the intersection (not the
superiority) of class issues with struggles around racism, sexism, and
heterosexism as the centerpiece, will not be easy.4 This model dictates that
labor activists must engage in efforts to build alliances with community,
grassroots, civil rights, religious and other social justice organizations.
However, these relationships cannot be similar to the old labor-community
alliances where the union only came to the community during times of
contractual renegotiation. Instead, if this new intersectional model is to
work, the labor movement must position itself as a central player in the
social movements of the marginalized and exploited. Unions must
organize in communities of color, not only to swell their ranks, but to build
a mass movement that can transform how Americans think about and
participate in the global economy, state and society. The relationship must
be based on a principle of reciprocity, where labor commits to the alliance
for the long-term and continues to work with community and civil rights
organizations between negotiation periods. Of course, community
organizations must strengthen their contribution to the partnership as well.
Community organizations must organize their own constituents in ways
that allow them to deliver bodies, votes, and resources. They must be
involved proactively in developing a broad agenda for social change, as
opposed to only responding to the crises of their individual neighborhoods.
Finally, community groups must be willing to organize around economic
justice (class) issues as they impact all segments of the community.
A valid question, though, addresses whether such a principled alliance
or partnership can emerge and endure. The recent labor struggles in New
Haven, Connecticut serve as an example of the possibility for such an
arrangement. In 1996, Local 217 engaged in a battle with Omni Hotel
management regarding the Omni Hotel at Yale University.5 During the
period of struggle, the union worked with local community groups to
advance its agenda as it had done in previous struggles. However, this
time, community groups waged their own campaigns against the Omni.
These numerous battles helped to build and reinforce a working
relationship between labor and local civic organizations. Eventually, all
4. See, e.g., Kimberle Williams Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality,
Identity Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color, in CRITIcAL RACE THEORY: THE
KEY WRITINGS THAT FORMED THE MOVEMENT 357 (Kimberle Crenshaw et al. eds., 1995).
5. See Kevin O'Connell & Erin White, All Eyes, Including Labor's, on the Omni, YALE
DAILY NEWS ONLINE (Apr. 2, 1997) <http://www.yaledailynews.com>; Mark Zaretsky,
Omni, Union Agree on 'Neutrality', NEW HAVEN REG. ONLINE (July 8, 1997)
<http://www.ctcentral.com>.
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the parties involved institutionalized this relationship by creating the New
Haven Community and Labor Coalition. The pages that follow detail the
effectiveness of the alliance and explore some of the inevitable
complications. Despite the success in the battle with the Omni, the New
Haven story is not complete. Instead, the work between the unions, civil
rights organizations and other community groups continues to evolve. At
each stage, everyone involved is confronted with the strengths and frailties
of such coalitions.
In the case of New Haven, community groups were instrumental in
winning the union struggle with the Omni. For example, if community
groups had not mounted numerous mini-campaigns against the Omni
management, it is doubtful the union would have won its demand for a
neutrality agreement when it did.6 However, what seems to be in question
is not what benefits these alliances provide to the union, but rather what
benefits are derived by the community groups. Specifically, we question
whether a true partnership or alliance can exist with some longevity where
everyone's voice is heard and everyone's agenda is equally pursued. In the
case of New Haven, there is a question as to whether the union was willing
to be a full or equal partner in struggles against the Omni, especially in
those struggles that did not focus explicitly on the union concerns of wages
and benefits for workers.
This article outlines in very broad terms the struggle of the unions,
local community and civil rights organizations against the Omni at Yale.
Integral to this discussion are the arguments both for and against a union
and community alliance. There is growing literature on the benefits and
dangers of labor/community relationships which is briefly discussed in the
following section. Having presented the contextual framework, the
specifics of the struggle in New Haven are detailed. A commentary of this
type cannot do justice to the work, planning, organizing, and strength of the
activists involved, but it aims to provide a general picture of the struggle
with a goal to motivate others to think about and discuss alliances between
labor and community.
7
I. UNIONS AND COMMUNITIES
Some scholars argue that the labor movement has always recognized
6. A neutrality agreement is an agreement where an employer agrees to remain neutral
on the question of the workers' right to organize a union. The employer also agrees to
recognize the union if a majority of workers sign union authorization cards designating the
union as their collective bargaining agent.
7. This specific discussion began at a symposium in March 1999 sponsored by the
University of Pennsylvania Law School and its Journal of Labor and Employment Law on
"Activism and the Law: The Intersections of the Labor and Civil Rights Movements."
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that community involvement is crucial to its success, noting the hard
lessons learned from employers' manipulation of communities to
undermine and defeat union efforts.8 Labor scholar James Craft, however,
suggests that unions first became involved in an organized fashion with
local communities following World War II and, in particular, after the
merger of the American Federation of Labor with the Congress of
Industrial Organizations ("AFL-CIO") in 1955 when unions experienced an
upsurge in membership, resources, and influence. Craft notes that both the
AFL and the CIO formed community service and community relations
committees. These community programs exemplified the approach to
community involvement that unions would endorse long into the future.
Two of the more dominant goals of the, programs were to encourage union
members to become involved as leaders in community service
organizations and to help existing community agencies in assisting union
members with personal, health, and welfare problems.9 Ultimately, the
motivation behind these activities was to strengthen the image and
community standing of the unions, and to enhance union organizing and
objectives. Not surprisingly, the unions typically used the community on
an "ad hoc" basis, mobilizing community support only when needed in a
struggle against an employer.10
Due to structural changes in the economy and complaints and
demands from marginal workforce sub-communities such as women,
people of color, gays, and lesbians, it has become increasingly difficult for
unions to ignore community activism. For example, many scholars argue
that factors such as deindustrialization, the changing racial, ethnic, and
gender composition of the workforce, and technological innovations
beginning in the 1970s have forced unions to reexamine the nature of their
relationship with communities, particularly communities of color.1"
Evidence reveals that as the fastest growing sector in the economy, the
service sector has the smallest share of unionized employees. 12 The service
sector also features African-Americans, Latinos, Asians, and women as the
dominant part of its workforce, creating problems for the traditional model
of union organization which primarily focused on the concerns of white
8. See BUILDING BRIDGES, supra note 2; Craft, supra note 2; Irving Bluestone, Walter
Reuther. Working-Class Hero, TIME, Dec. 7, 1998, at 157-58.
9. See Craft, supra note 2.
10. See id.
11. See WILIAM JULUS WILSON, THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED: THE INNER CITY, THE
UNDERCLASS, AND PUBLIC PoLicY (1987); Norman Hill, Forging a Partnership Between
Blacks and Unions, MONTHLY LAB. REV., Aug. 1987, at 38-39; JoAnn Wypijewski, A
Stirring in the Land, NATION, Sept. 8, 1997, at 17-18.
12. Monika Bauerlein, Beyond the Lunch Bucket: Labor Discovers Community Issue,
UTNE READER, May-June 1996, at 20.
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men.13 Thus, unions that have traditionally relied on white men working in
blue-collar manufacturing jobs are now realizing that the new source of
union workers will undoubtedly come from the African-American, Latino
and Asian workers who dominate the workforces of the low-wage
industries. These workers possess an intersectional view of their plight,
regarding multiple systems of oppression, including their employment, as
defining their living conditions.14 Consequently, these groups increasingly
demand that organizations interested in their progress, including unions,
address the multiple concerns and barriers that they and their families
confront in their workplaces and neighborhoods.
Union activists now realize that new constituents are not only
concerned with traditional "labor" issues, but also with issues such as
residential segregation, welfare reform and repressive immigration
restrictions. This, in turn, has prompted the reconstruction of
labor/community alliances. More broadly, the recent failures of both labor
and community groups to secure important victories for their constituents
has led the two entities to each other. Some scholars argue that the
realignment of the economy, the ideological victories of the right, the
explosion in temporary, part-time and low-wage work, the growth of
workfare and prison labor, the assaults on poor people and immigrants, and
the failure of "identity politics" and "business unionism" have all
challenged labor and civil rights organizations to produce radically
different organizing structures. 15 Labor unions are concentrating on ways
to access new members, primarily focusing on people of color, and have
responded by turning to community organizations for assistance. In
addition, unions are demonstrating their commitment to communities of
color by entering into various community struggles.
One manifestation of the evolving relationship between labor and
community groups can be seen in the changes in labor leadership and
organizing efforts. According to Peter Dreier, another labor scholar, the
unions that have made the most progress in recent years in recruiting
members have all formed alliances with church and community groups,
13. See Hector Figueroa, The Growing Force of Latino Labor, November/December,
NACLA REPORT ON AM., Nov.-Dec. 1996, at 19-22; Rinku Sen, Winning Action for Gender
Equity: A Plan for Organizing Communities of Color, in WOMEN TRANSFORMING POLITICS:
AN ALTERNATIVE READER 302-23 (Cathy J. Cohen et al. eds., 1997); Eve S. Weinbaum,
Transforming Democracy: Rural Women and Labor Resistance, in WOMEN TRANSFORMING
POLITICS: AN ALTERNATrVE READER 324-39 (Cathy J. Cohen et al. eds., 1997).
14. See Jones, supra note 3.
15. See Stanley Aronowitz, Towards Radicalism: The Death and Rebirth of the
American Left, in RADICAL DEMOCRACY: IDENTITY, CmzENSHIP, AND THE STATE 81 (David
Trend ed., 1996); Michael C. Dawson, A Black Counterpublic?: Economic Earthquakes,
Racial Agenda(s), and Black Politics, in THE BLACK PUBLIC SPHERE 199 (The Black Public
Sphere collective eds., 1995); Wypijewski, supra note 11.
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borrowed tactics from civil rights and grassroots campaigns, and recruited
organizers from civil rights, neighborhood and women's groups. 16 Under
new national leadership, Dreier continues, the labor movement has an
emerging political agenda very similar to that taken up by many
progressive social justice organizations. 17  This new community-based
agenda of labor includes: protecting social programs, advocating for
national health care, demanding increased enforcement of anti-
discrimination laws, and working for an increase in the minimum wage.
Labor's expanded agenda is believed to have resulted, in part, from the
infusion of new leadership into the labor movement. In particular, it has
been argued that organizers with backgrounds in the social movements of
the 1960s are emerging as the leaders in the new collective action-oriented
labor/community coalitions.18
Community and civil rights organizations are beginning to regain
confidence in the labor movement's commitment to a broader agenda.
Historically, African-American, Latino, and Asian American leaders have
been willing to work with labor activists for the advancement of workers of
color, despite labor's history of excluding people of color from unionized
jobs. However, in light of recent gestures toward workers of color from the
labor movement, the increasing representation of people of color in the
leadership of labor unions, the predominance of service sector low-wage
jobs as the only available employment "opportunities" for the majority of
people of color, and the survival needs of community and civil rights
organizations, new coalitions involving both labor and community groups
are being explored.' 9  When necessary, community and civil rights
organizations have been willing to accept labor's waffling position on
controversial issues because these organizations, searching for resources to
stay afloat, need the financial, institutional, and membership support that
labor can provide. Community/labor coalitions often differ from traditional
"ideological politics" by not agreeing on a single party line. Instead, the
coalitions operate with political norms that recognize that groups in the
coalition sometimes agree to disagree.
20
16. See Peter Dreier, What Farrakhan Left Out: Labor Solidarity or Racial Separatism?
17 COMMONWEAL, Dec. 15, 1995, at 10-11.
17. See id.
18. See Joan Fitzgerald & Louise Simmons, From Consumption to Production: Labor
Participation in Grassroots Movements in Pittsburgh and Hartford, 26 URB. AFF. Q. 512
(1991).
19. See Bauerlein, supra note 12; Figueroa, supra note 13; Linda Ocasio, On the Line:
Latinos on Labor's Cutting Edge, NACLA REP. ON AM., Nov.-Dec. 1996, at 18; Linda
Ocasio, Portrait of an Organizer: Edgar DeJesus, NACLA REP. ON AM., Nov.-Dec. 1996,
at 27; Margot Homblower, Picking a New Fight, TIME, Nov. 25, 1996, at 64-65; Barry
Yeoman, Spiritual Union: A Case Study, NATION, Dec. 1, 1997, at 15-16.
20. See BUILDING BRIDGEs, supra note 2.
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Other scholars are beginning to look more closely at the multiple
forms in which these alliances develop. For example, Craft provides a
typology of the different relationships and alliances that labor forms with
different segments of communities.2 He and others contend that without a
clearer understanding of the type of community/labor alliances being
employed, analysts and activists will have a difficult time discerning what
went wrong or right and why. The strategic alliances outlined by Craft
include the extensive community model, community subgroup model,
community action groups model, and local government officials/units. He
argues that the goal of an extensive community alliance is to involve the
entire community in actions taken against an employer. Such a strategy
usually involves semi-coordinated mass grassroots activity from
community groups, clergy, politicians, and even chambers of commerce in
the form of actions such as citywide boycotts. The community subgroup
model attempts to develop alliances with issue-oriented sub-groups in the
community including civil rights groups, women's groups, churches, and
consumer groups. Ultimately, these alliances are used to provide domain-
targeted leverage against an employer, by mobilizing constituencies that
the employer needs. Alliances with community action groups are a third
model of labor/community relations.22 These groups usually include grass-
roots organizations comprised of neighborhood groups, small businesses
and churches that are willing to engage in an array of unpredictable, and
more public, tactics against corporations. Finally, the last community/labor
alliance that Craft outlines involves government officials.23 In this case,
unions encourage politicians to take political positions which will publicly
legitimize the union's demands. Public officials proposing ordinances and
official resolutions that can affect employers often manifest such a strategy.
Borrowing from Craft's typology, the New Haven-Omni case may be best
understood as typifying either an extensive community alliance or a
community subgroup model.
In addition to labor/community alliances being different in each
location and each struggle, unions also approach differing communities by
emphasizing different themes. There are three major strategies that unions
often use to forge community alliances: (1) identification of shared goals
and interests; (2) emphasis on equity; and (3) practicing reciprocity. 24 The
objective of the first strategy is to convince the community that its goals
and the union's goals converge, and that both parties have mutual interests
in "the" situation. Unions use the second strategy, emphasizing equity, to
point out employers' violations of the community's norms of fairness and
21. See Craft, supra note 2, at 148.
22. See iL at 149.
23. See id. at 150.
24. See id.
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reasonable behavior toward workers who are also members of the
community. Finally, unions use strategic reciprocity over the long-term
and short-term. In the long-term, the union becomes involved in
community service efforts and draws on this accumulated credit to seek the
community's support in the union's efforts or drives?25 In the short-term,
the union asks for help in a particular effort, offering in exchange to help
with another struggle being waged by politicians or civil rights groups.
26
As illustrated later, the unions in New Haven, like most unions, engaged in
a combination of the outlined strategies in their struggle against the Omni.
Again, recent moves by labor to locate its struggles in communities is
not the result of purely principled thinking. Instead, as some observers
have argued, the labor movement's participation in coalitions with diverse
groups, including women's organizations, environmental groups, and
grassroots activists, results from the internal crisis of the labor movement.27
This perspective forces one to consider the potentially negative
consequences and difficulties of forming such alliances. In fact, there have
been several critiques of labor/community coalitions offered by scholars. 
2
Labor scholar Scipes details numerous weaknesses with community and
labor alliances.29 She argues, for example, that traditionally both national
and local unions are structured hierarchically and bureaucratically, and
once union leaders become bureaucrats, they become primarily concerned
with keeping their positions of power. She contends that we should expect
union leaders to oppose "rank and file participation in any movement
which the leaders cannot directly control, [like those mounted
independently by local community groups]." 0  Additionally,
labor/community coalitions often are asymmetric in terms of power and
fragile with regard to lasting power. Specifically, Scipes notes that the
structures of the coalitions themselves are neither democratic nor equal, so
that when unions become involved in coalitions, it is usually to a limited
extent and under conditions which force community groups to submerge
their goals to labor's goals. Finally, she maintains that workers are
generally not ideologically progressive on most social issues, so that other
forms of oppression, including racism, sexism and heterosexism, may
eventually tear the coalition apart.
Craft also ponders the difficulties of these alliances, arguing that
recent experiences of labor/community alliances have been "ad hoe
25. See id.
26. See id.
27. See BUILDING BRIDGES, supra note 2, at 195; Aronowitz, supra note 15, at 82;
Scipes, supra note 2, at 34.
28. See BUILDING BRIDGES, supra note 2, at 245, 325; Craft, supra note 2; Scipes, supra
note 2.
29. See Scipes, supra note 2, at 37.
30. Id.
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reactions to crises" rather than planned mutual and strategic partnerships.
31
He also contends that union leaders, having no training in the community
coalition-building process, may be uncomfortable with the specific tactics
used by community groups, and may have difficulty working with local or
professional activists and organizers who reject their "hierarchical
structures of authority. 3 2  Craft predicts that this coalitional/alliance
approach is unlikely to emerge as a sustained practice used widely by
labor.33
The fate of labor/community coalitions and alliances has yet to be
decided. Unlike Craft and Scipes, some see these new coalitions as the
solution to the troubles plaguing both labor and civil rights organizations.
4
Kim Moody suggests that labor's participation in coalitions might lead to a
breakdown in the bureaucratic structure that has had a stranglehold on labor
over the past fifty years.35 Brecher and Costello, in their book Building
Bridges, make a similar argument suggesting that labor/community
alliances could be a radical challenge to the hierarchical and established
power relations that have plagued American society since its inception. 6
They assert that labor/community coalitions could serve as a vital strategy
for effective social change.37 These alliances could also have extensive
political clout because they would speak for the majority of the population
which is currently excluded from economic and political decision making
and, if mobilized, would represent a tremendous social force.3' As noted
earlier, the data on these new and complicated relationships between labor
and communities is being accumulated day-by-day and city-by-city. Only
by examining the different examples of this type of alliance can we begin
to gain a knowledge that will allow us to discern how and why these
alliances work. To that end, consider this brief discussion on New Haven,
which delineates the successes and difficulties such alliances may face.
II. NEW HAVEN
Throughout its history, New Haven has always been a bastion of
union organizing. For example, citywide activity in the form of labor
organizing led The New York Times to report in 1886 that New Haven had
31. See Craft, supra note 2.
32. Id.
33. See id.
34. See Kim Moody, Building a Labor Movement for the 1990s: Cooperation and
Concessions or Confrontation and Coalition, in BUILDING BRIDGES, supra note 2.
35. See id.
36. See BUILDINGBRMGES, supra note 2.
37. See id.
38. See id.
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more strikes per capita than any other city in the country.3 9 This history
also includes the organizing of nearly 10,000 garment workers during the
1930s, as well as the creation of two labor newspapers, including one in
Italian to serve the poor Italian immigrants who built most of the gothic
buildings currently occupied by Yale University.4° More recently, the labor
conflicts in New Haven have been dominated by the struggles of Locals 34
and 35 of the Hotel Employees and Restaurant Employees International
Union (H.E.R.E.) at Yale. It is in this context of labor activism and
struggle that the Omni-New Haven case is set. Before the story is detailed,
however, some understanding of recent labor struggles at Yale is necessary
to meaningfully assess the Omni struggle.
A. The Emergence of Local 34
As one might expect from the largest employer in town, most of New
Haven's recent and public labor struggles have been waged against Yale
University and its employment practices. Currently, two union locals
organize Yale workers: Local 35, which represents service and
maintenance workers (many of whom are people of color), and Local 34,
which represents clerical and technical workers (many of whom are white
women). Both Locals are part of the Hotel Employees and Restaurant
Employees International Union (H.E.R.E.), which also includes Local 217,
the local responsible for representing the workers at the Yale Omni, and the
Graduate Employees and Students Organization (GESO), the organization
of Yale graduate students attempting to unionize. These four groups
constitute the H.E.R.E. Alliance in New Haven.
In the early 1980s when only Local 35 existed amongst Yale workers,
John Wilhelm, now the President of the H.E.R.E. International, was among
many influential figures responsible for and instrumental in encouraging an
organizing drive for Local 34.41 In response to Yale's persistent attacks on
Local 35 in the 1970s, Wilhelm decided that it was best to increase the
number of unionized workers on campus.42 Wilhelm, then a Yale graduate
recently hired by Vincent Sirabella of H.E.R.E. Local 217, convinced the
International to put major resources behind this organizing drive. Since
they were attempting to organize a largely female clerical pool, there was
also a decision to focus on developing rank and file leaders who were
39. See Paul Bass, Hidden History: New Haven Finds a New Past, THE PROGRESSIvE,
July 1990, at 28-29.
40. See id.
41. See Interview with Andrea Cole, Secretary, Department of Economics, Yale
University and Staff Person for Locals 34, 35, 217, and GESO (Jan. 27, 1999).
42. See id.; see also John Wilhelm, A Short History of Unionization at Yale, in SOCIAL
TExT, Winter 1996, at 13.
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mostly women. One of the individuals to emerge from this effort was
Andrea Cole, a secretary from the Economics department and a local anti-
Apartheid activist.43 As it turned out, Cole would be instrumental in
winning that first fight for recognition of Local 34 and establishing and
maintaining the labor/community alliance in New Haven.
Andrea Cole, then known as Andrea Ross, emigrated from South
Africa during the early 1980s at the height of the anti-Apartheid movement.
She became actively involved in such efforts, helping to organize the anti-
Apartheid organization at Yale. During this process, Cole built strong
relationships with other local activists and community members across the
city. She later drew upon these contacts and her legitimacy as an organizer
for the unions. Specifically, during Locals 34 and 35's contract struggles in
1989, 1992, and in 1995/96, it was Cole's responsibility to obtain support
from community groups for the Locals' organizing effort. After the union
secured victories in each of these struggles, she was one of six rank and file
members hired to a full-time organizing position. She has held this
position since 1996, continuing her efforts to obtain community support for
union projects.
While Cole's role as the community organizer signaled the importance
of New Haven's communities to the union's success, it would be some time
before the union would once again venture back into the community for
any sustained interaction. It seems that the unions effectively relegated
their work with New Haven community groups to an "ad-hoc" status. Cole
has explained that in the intervening years between the union's first victory
in 1984 and the renegotiation of their contract in 1989, and then again in
1992, the union's small staff was overwhelmed by dealing with and
responding to the university administration.44 The antics of the university
consumed the time and energy of the staff, leaving no resources for
maintaining the community relationships that had been essential to their
victory during the first strike.45 However, in 1989 and again in 1992 when
the unions needed help, Cole, a bit sheepishly, called on the same
community leaders for support.
46
Not surprisingly, when Cole approached community leaders again in
1992, she encountered some resentment about the absence of the union
during the intervening years.47 Even when the union attempted to respond
to community needs, they often did so without fully understanding the
interests of the community. For example, during the 1989 contract
negotiations the union heard complaints from community members about
43. See Interview with Warren Heyman (Jan. 22, 1999).
44. See Cole, supra note 41.
45. See id.
46. See id.
47. See id.
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Yale's unwillingness to hire New Haven residents, particularly people of
color.48 Attempting to address this need, the union demanded that Yale
institute a training program. As it was initially conceptualized, individuals
would receive training but no guarantee of a job. The union even agreed to
use its own money to implement the program when Yale balked at the idea
of funding such an endeavor. However, much to the surprise of union
negotiators, community leaders were not interested in a program that
consisted of mere training. They wanted jobs and insisted that this program
guarantee employment. Consequently, Local 34 returned to the bargaining
table with Yale and renegotiated the training program to ensure that jobs
for trainees were guaranteed after their successful completion of the
program.49 The New Haven Residents' Training Program is still running
successfully.
B. 1996 Battle with Yale
In 1996, with Local 35's contract up for negotiation, Yale commenced
an aggressive attack on the unions.50 For eighteen months, Yale attempted
to eliminate and replace union jobs with temporary, outsourced
employment. Replicating global business trends, the university decided to
contract out 600 union jobs to a non-union employer, transforming them
into low-wage, no-benefit, temporary positions.5' The university engaged
in numerous tactics to reach its goal, including spending more than $2.5
million on consultants with union-busting experience and implementing a
52public relations campaign targeted against the unions.
In response to pressure from Yale, Locals 34 and 35 embarked on
what Cole deemed ten weeks of "rolling strikes." Cole recalls:
[F]irst Local 34 went out for a four-week period, while Local 35
members contributed $100 each per week to a strike fund but did
not observe picket lines. Then, when students left town for two
weeks of vacation, everyone went back to work. When classes
resumed, Local 35 went on strike while Local 34 members were
at work and contributing $100 per week to sustain Local 35
strikers.
53
It became clear that striking alone would not win this battle. The
48. See id.
49. See Interview with Andrea Cole, Secretary, Department of Economics, Yale
University and Staff Person for Locals 34, 35, 217, and GESO (Mar. 24, 1999).
50. See Cole, supra note 41; Heyman, supra note 43.
51. See Cole, supra note 41; Heyman, supra note 43; Bruce Robbins & Andrew Ross,
The Yale Strike Dossier, SocLAL TEXT, Winter 1996.
52. See Cole, supra note 41.
53. Id.
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unions needed outside assistance. Thus, Cole found herself going back to
community groups and asking them to support the unions, only to receive
the same resentment as before. The community wanted to know, "where
have you been? 54 The unions went into the community believing they
would once again be able to garner support. Having not been highly visible
since the 1992 effort, assistance was much more difficult to earn this time.
Facing possible failure, the unions were forced to embrace a new strategy.
Traditionally, the strength of the Locals is centered in the organizing
committees in each department on campus. However, the unions initiated a
new strategy that was a hybrid of national recommendations and local
innovation: organize in members' neighborhoods. Using a computer-
mapping program that Cole says they just "happened upon," the unions
mapped where each member lived, paying special attention to the
neighborhoods in which workplace leaders resided. From these lists, they
then established neighborhood organizing committees. Members of the
neighborhood organizing committees lobbied their families, neighbors,
clergy, and elected officials. They also held neighborhood meetings where
workers "testified" about the ramifications for themselves, their families,
and their community if they lost their jobs and benefits. A total of thirteen
of these meetings were held in a two-week period with an overall
attendance of about 2,500 people. 5 In addition to the meetings, the unions
produced pamphlets profiling different segments of the union membership.
The pamphlets highlighted the stories of specific workers and detailed what
Yale's efforts meant for these workers, their families, and neighborhoods.
Different pamphlets were distributed in various neighborhoods, which
featured workers familiar to residents in each area.
Obviously, such efforts began to demand the attention of New Haven
community leaders, elected officials, and the clergy. In many ways, it was
a group of clergy in New Haven who would "morally" break Yale. As the
struggle heated up, Cole began approaching members of the clergy, asking
them to come up with a statement to "raise the moral floor. 5 6 Two local
pastors were appointed by the Greater New Haven Clergy Association to
draft a statement in support of the union struggle and circulate it to other
clergy members.1 The statement, crafted on behalf of the Association,
eventually became known as the "David and Goliath" statement. It was a
bold statement which condemned Yale for its action against the union,
portraying the university as Goliath fighting against a smaller, but moral,
David:
54. See id.
55. See id.
56. Id.
57. The New Haven Clergy Association is an organization of local clergy involved in
various social justice causes in the New Haven area.
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THE ANCIENT BIBLICAL STORY of David and Goliath is an
event that illustrates how the strength of justice prevails over raw
power. As members of the clergy, we have watched with
increasing concern as Yale University, like the Goliath of old,
has unleashed its enormous economic and corporate power on
two little David unions, the working men and women who are the
members of Local 34 and Local 35.... Yale University is a
pioneer, a leader, and an innovator in medicine, in law, and the
natural sciences. Why not also in social justice, in employee
relations.
5 8
With the help of the union, the statement was sent out to clergy across the
city with a signature card attached asking them to sign on to the effort.
Additionally, union members on the neighborhood organizing committees
approached their own, as well as neighborhood clergy asking them to join
as well. Ultimately, 105 church leaders signed the bold statement. Once
all the signatures were secured, the union, sensing the statement was a
winner, went the extra step and decided to publish it in the local
newspapers.5 9
Riding the momentum shift in favor of the union, generated by the
David and Goliath statement, the Locals organized a massive
demonstration on December 10, 1996. The coalition of people consisted of
union members (including AFL-CIO president, John Sweeney), clergy,
elected officials, and leaders of civil rights and community organizations.
During the demonstration, 312 people were arrested as part of the massive
civil disobedience action on the Yale campus.60 Reeling from the David
and Goliath statement, the massive arrests and the resulting bad press, the
university settled the contract dispute seven days later.
It was after this victory that the H.E.R.E. Locals made a conscious and
deliberate decision concerning community activism. They agreed that they
could not relegate the community to secondary status, but rather they must
commit to building strong, long-term alliances. The locals decided that an
outreach position needed to be institutionalized, with Cole serving as the
community liaison. Such positions are found only in San Francisco, Los
Angeles, Las Vegas, and now New Haven. Soon after that decision, Cole
went back to the community groups that had assisted the union in their
struggle against Yale and discussed with them what their next collaborative
steps should be.
61
58. The ad ran in The Inner City from December 18, 1996 until January 1, 1997.
59. See Cole, supra note 41; Heyman, supra note 43.
60. See Behi Rabbani, AFL-CIO President, 300 Union Supporters Arrested, YALE
DAILY NEws ONIUNE (Dec. 11, 1996) <http://yaledailynews.com>.
61. It was also during this time that the H.E.R.E. Alliance, including Locals 34, 35, 217,
and GESO, was formed. This union alliance was initiated in recognition of the fact that
during this latest campaign, better coordination was needed among the Yale unions in New
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During her meetings with community groups, Cole heard repeatedly
that people wanted to take on another campaign. Not content with their
victory against Yale, a coalition of labor and community groups wanted to
venture into new territory. Talk began to focus on a living wage
amendment. During the 1996 negotiations with Yale, the Locals
introduced a living wage proposal. Although it was not considered, the
coalition discussed introducing it again, this time at the city council. With
the momentum of the recent victory in December, the coalition of groups
consisting of the H.E.R.E. Alliance, New Haven Clergy Association, Elm
City Congregations Organization (consisting of twenty-two religious
groups), New Haven Central Labor Council (a coalition of the AFL-CIO
and the state federation), and the Greater New Haven NAACP decided to
take the living wage fight to the city council. Surprisingly, the mayor and
city council, not wanting to take on this charged coalition, pushed the bill
through in a fast four months. The resulting ordinance is limited in its
reach, guaranteeing pay above minimum wage only to workers employed
by subcontractors doing work for the city. Despite the limiting scope of the
amendment, it should be seen as illustrative of recent trends among labor
and community alliances, which in increasing numbers have engaged in
successful municipal fights for living wage ordinances in over thirty-one
cities across the country such as Chicago, Baltimore, and Milwaukee. With
yet another victory in place, the coalition of groups listed above decided to
institutionalize their working relationship in the form of the New Haven
Community and Labor Coalition (NHCLC). Members believed that this
body would ensure the longevity of a reciprocal relationship of action and
social change. Everyone in the group would have an equal chance to shape
the agenda and lives of their constituents, while making accountability
clear. It was not long after the establishment of the NHCLC that the
struggle at the Omni emerged.
C. The Omni at Yale
In August of 1994 the City of New Haven announced that Baltimore
Inner-Harbor developer David Cordish had agreed to take over the then
bankrupt Park Plaza Hotel. The Park Plaza Hotel, which sat a few blocks
from Yale's main campus, was built during the 1960s and was expected to
Haven. More generally, some staff members believed that the labor movement as a whole
needed to figure out how to organize big groups of people and this alliance was a step in that
direction. The H.E.R.E. Alliance is not officially recognized on paper, although the member
organizations meet weekly and have overlapping staff. Andrea Cole was appointed as the
staff person working for Locals 34, 35, 217 and GESO. She is responsible solely for
organizing and maintaining contacts between the unions and community and civil rights
organizations.
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be New Haven's "premier hotel and convention center. 62 However, in
1993, suffering from low occupancy rates in the midst of an economic
recession and competition from hotels and conference centers in the
suburbs, the owners of the Park Plaza filed for bankruptcy. An
unsuccessful search was performed by the Yale administration to replace
the failing Park Plaza with another first-class hotel and/or conference
facility close to the campus. This failed search helped facilitate the near
consensus among local stakeholders to support Cordish's effort to purchase
and redevelop the Park Plaza.
With nearly ten million dollars in state aid plus his own private
financial contribution, Cordish promised to upgrade the Park Plaza to a
four-star operation with 306 rooms, a 9,000 square foot ballroom, a 7,000
square foot rooftop restaurant, and a 22,000 square foot conference center.
The hotel was also to provide 250 new jobs and $270,000 a year in taxes to
New Haven residents. The significance of new jobs and tax monies is
magnified considering that New Haven continues to suffer from economic
devastation and depression. For instance, in 1997 New Haven registered an
unemployment rate of 6.4%, significantly higher than the statewide 5.1%
unemployment rate.6' Between 1992-1997, New Haven experienced a
decline in the growth rate of its labor force of 4.9%, compared to the rest of
the state, which experienced an increase of 4.3%. 64 Thus, this hotel was
intended to serve as the centerpiece for a larger renewal project of
downtown and of the broader New Haven community.
In 1995, at the very first meeting held in Philadelphia to negotiate the
development agreement between Cordish and the City of New Haven, all
the stakeholders were in the room: Cordish, New Haven officials,
Connecticut representatives and leaders of Local 217, which had organized
employees at the Park Plaza from the late 1960s until it closed. At the end
of the day, everyone walked out of the meeting believing they had crafted
an agreement that would facilitate the continued development of the hotel
and the unionization of its employees. There were however,
"unsuspecting" parts of this agreement that would fuel a nearly two-year
battle between the hotel and labor and community groups. For example, as
part of the plan, city and union officials agreed to move bus routes and
three major bus stops away from the hotel area, without realizing that this
seemingly innocuous agreement would mobilize New Haven citizens
against the Omni. Furthermore, the original document agreed upon also
included commitments from Cordish that he would hire former Park Plaza
62. Dee Segel, State to Aid Ailing New Haven Hotel; Park Plaza to Undergo Major
Conversion, HARTFORiD COURANT, Aug. 27, 1994, at Fl.
63. See CoNNEcTicUT DEPARTMENT OF EcoNoMIc AND COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT,
TOvN PROFILES 1998-1999 (1999).
64. See id.
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employees and that at least thirty-five percent of workers hired at the hotel
would be New Haven residents.65 Again, this part of the plan would stir
community action as the Omni management and civil rights and union
leaders differed on the type of training and jobs these prospective
employees should receive.
Finally, and most important to the Union, Cordish agreed to a card
count neutrality process for the unionization of workers. The idea behind a
card count neutrality agreement or process is that once a majority of
workers sign union membership cards, labor leaders call on management to
recognize the union. The card count system, in which employers remain
neutral, is preferred to union elections where the employer can mount a
nasty anti-union campaign. 66 The union believed this to be the most
important guarantee because of their first-hand experience with employer
harassment and intimidation during union elections and contract
negotiations at Yale. Both local and national labor leaders were eyeing the
agreement, believing that the former Park Plaza would be an ideal location
to test this new union organizing strategy.
When Warren Heyman, the secretary/treasurer of Local 217 left the
meeting in Philadelphia, he believed that the interests of the workers had
been secured. Cordish had agreed in principle to a union shop and a card
count neutrality process. Heyman was not even particularly alarmed when
he received an eleventh-hour call before the signing of the agreement
telling him that Cordish was now refusing a successor clause. A successor
clause would have guaranteed that anyone to whom Cordish sold the hotel
would be required to comply with the specified arrangements in the
original document including the neutrality agreement. Believing that
Cordish would never sell his controlling interest in the hotel and after
receiving reassurances from numerous sources that any unforeseeable new
owner would in good faith acknowledge the neutrality agreement, Local
217 agreed to the document without a successor clause.
In the summer of 1996, the Omni Hotel Corporation was named as
David Cordish's partner and planned operator of the hotel upon its
completion. This process, where the developer hires a company to run the
hotel, is common in the world of hotel development. Consequently, the
announcement of the selection of the Omni as the hotel operator was not
particularly eventful. Labor activists knew that only two Omni Hotels out
of thirty-five total properties were unionized; however, stakeholders in
New Haven again provided public reassurances that employees would be
65. See Molly Ball, Omni, Local Leaders Feud over Minority Hiring, YALE HERALD
ONLINE (Oct. 3, 1997) <http://www.yaleherald.com>; Heyman, supra note 43.
66. According to Andrea Cole, "NLRB elections are used by employees and their legal
consultants to create an atmosphere of fear and to thwart union organizing drives." Cole,
supra note 49.
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able to decide, free from fear and intimidation, if the Omni at Yale would
be a union hotel. Notwithstanding all the reassurances, the optimism that
once prevailed among union leaders changed to apprehension when
Cordish sold all but one percent of his shares in the hotel to the Omni
Corporation. This now meant that without a successor clause, the Omni
was free to withdraw from Cordish's previous guarantee of a card count
neutrality process. This, however, would not be the first battle Omni
management would confront surrounding the new hotel at Yale.
The first public skirmish to develop with the Omni management was
not initiated by the union, but by community groups. This conflict centered
on the rerouting of bus lines and bus stops around the hotel. As noted
above, buried deep in the original 130 page development agreement
between Cordish and the City of New Haven was a tiny clause proposed by
the developer and ratified by the Board of Alders (New Haven's City
Council) that agreed to relocate thirteen bus stops away from the New
Haven Green. The Green is an area directly across the street from the
Omni where many of New Haven's poorer and younger residents, most of
whom are people of color, congregate to take the bus. Hotel officials
claimed that the bus stops occupied valuable parking spaces and caused
traffic congestion.
The controversy around the bus stops began to heat up at the end of
1996, when a consultant's report publicly put the proposed rerouting into
question. After a careful examination of the suggested change in bus
routes, the consultant found that the existing routing plan, with its hub at
the New Haven Green, was the most efficient plan for the city. The report
subtly suggested that the agreed-upon move was merely a political
concession to Cordish, which was of no benefit to citizens.
The finding of the city's hired consultant preceded the work of an
advisory board, comprised of city officials and concerned citizens, that the
mayor established in early 1997. The advisory board was put into place to
deal with the increasing anger from community groups about the bus
rerouting.67 As the findings from the consultant's report were released, city
officials hoped that the establishment of an advisory board would be a
soothing response to citizens' demands that the city abandon its original
agreement with Cordish (now the Omni Corporation) to reroute the buses.
The city's decision to change the bus routes came under greater scrutiny as,
"[c]itizen group representatives charged that Omni Hotel's motivations
were racist and elitist, and that the city's decision-making process ignored
the needs of the citizens-especially those of minority, poor, and disabled
residents. ,
68
67. See Nicole Itano, Compromise Reached on Bus Stops, YALE DAILY NEWS ONLINE
(Sept. 8, 1997) <http://www.yaledailynews.com>.
68. Id.
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An alliance of community groups, including the NAACP and the
Coalition for People, mobilized their membership in response to this issue.
On one occasion it was reported that:
More than 30 senior citizens, residents with disabilities, and
working mothers gathered at the Chapel-Temple bus stop
yesterday morning, waving neon signs and chanting, "We shall
not be moved."
69
The struggle over the bus stops eventually died down once the city
compromised with Omni management. The city agreed to move three bus
routes, while keeping in place all the bus stops around the Omni. Activists
counted the fact that very little change actually occurred as a victory. What
seemed to be a disappointment for some activists was the ineffectiveness of
the labor/community alliance. Specifically, some community groups
voiced concern over the fact that the unions were largely absent from this
struggle. Cole noted that the unions were not that involved in the effort,
and in particular, they were unable to play a leadership role.70 She did
comment, however, that this fight along with others waged by local
community and civil rights organizations, helped to establish the context
and build support for union fights.71 Heyman went one step further and
suggested that the unions could not get fully involved in this struggle
because they feared compromising their relationship with city officials.
72
Instead, they chose to play a smaller role behind the scenes. This initial
struggle surrounding the bus stops is illustrative of the difficulties involved
in crafting a reciprocal relationship between labor and community groups.
It seems that while the unions were committed to supporting community-
initiated struggles, at least behind the scenes, their first priority was to
protect their interests and contacts in the domain of "worker's" issues.
The next issue to take center stage in the ongoing struggle against the
Omni was the implementation of a training program for local residents.
Local 217 already had experience securing and implementing training
programs. For example, it had developed a training program four years
earlier at the Westin Convention Center and Hotel in Providence, Rhode
Island. There, the union trained over one hundred residents of Providence,
mostly people of color, who were then given preferential placement for
69. Isaiah Wilner, Citizen Groups Protest Bus Stop Agreement, YALE DAILY NEWS
ONLINE (Oct. 2, 1997) <http://www.yaledailynews.com>.
70. Specifically, Cole notes that "the reason the unions were not involved publicly with
the bus stop fight was because Local 217 was at the time that it surfaced publicly, involved
in intense negotiations with both the Mayor and the Omni management. Correctly or
incorrectly, it seemed likely that a public profile on the bus stop issue could potentially
jeopardize a settlement on all the other issues." Cole, supra note 49.
71. See id.
72. See Heyman, supra note 43.
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higher-paying, "front-of-the-house" jobs. The national trend of the hotel
industry is to relegate workers of color to jobs that are out of sight of
customers-jobs such as housekeeping or maintenance. These are known
as "back-of-the-house" jobs and are usually filled by part-time and
unskilled labor. Front-of-the-house jobs are those that necessitate contact
with customers, such as responsibility at the registration desk. White
workers populate those jobs most heavily. Collaborating with the Urban
League, community groups, and other local unions in Providence, Local
217 instituted a training program that put local residents, mostly people of
color, in front-of-the-house jobs.
Once planning for the Omni project was underway, the union
attempted to import this type of job-training model to New Haven, where it
would serve as the union's "safety-net". 73 Fundamentally, the union saw
such a program as serving its interests, since it believed that people trained
through such a program would be pro-union.74 Unfortunately for the union,
the city and Omni had a different type of training program in mind. The
city devised a training program in conjunction with the Omni and the
citywide Enterprise Community Council (ECC).75 This program was in
part a response to the head of the ECC, William Battle.
Bill Battle, an African-American conservative, proposed that the city
and Omni institute an attitude-training program. The Omni structured the
program, called the "Enterprise Training Program," around the idea that
everyone enrolled would receive training in interpersonal or "soft skills,"
such as improving attitudes, dress, and hygiene.76 The city's development
office advocated this program over the union's training program, which
predominantly concentrated on job-skills, not attitude and behavioral
issues. In response to the city's proposal, both the Omni and the Regional
Workforce Development Board (RWDB), which abandoned its agreed-
upon partnership with the NAACP and Local 217 to develop a skills-based
training program, eagerly accepted the "Enterprise Training Program."
Those involved in running this program argued that skills-based training
would come later. Specifically, they explained that individuals hired out of
73. See Heyman, supra note 43.
74. See Cole, supra note 49. However, Cole notes that the total benefits of such a
training program to the union are still unclear. Similar programs run by H.E.R.E. Locals in
New Haven have in fact not had that effect. The major benefit of the program is the
certainty that some workers of color obtain front-of-the-house jobs instead of unskilled
back-of-the-house jobs.
75. The ECC is the citywide body administering the city's Enterprise programs-
programs and funds generated by the city's federal status as an Enterprise City, similar to an
Empowerment Zone.
76. Activists refer to training which focuses on these things as "soft skills," as opposed
to those skills directly related to the performance of a job such as word processing. See
Ball, supra note 65.
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the training program for permanent jobs would be given on-site training in
job-specific skills. Michelle Bennet, Omni's corporate communications
manager stated:
[C]andidates are not necessarily graded on their past or even their
present skills, but graded on their capacity to learn. Once
Enterprise training is in place and the applicant is hired, we train
them for whatever specific job they're hired for.77
Local community activists and union officials were unhappy with the
Omni's proposed program, and argued that the Omni was only interested in
teaching soft skills and potentially tracking employees of color into back-
of-the-house jobs. In response to what they saw as another tactic by the
Omni to deny full opportunities to New Haven residents, particularly
residents of color, community groups in conjunction with the union again
mobilized against the Omni. In spite of their actions, the program
proceeded as scheduled for at least two reasons. First, the union was
preoccupied with the fight over the neutrality agreement and worried that a
full battle over the skills training program would again jeopardize the
mayor's support for ensuring a neutrality agreement for the Omni. The
union decided that the skills training program was not a winnable issue in
terms of the losses it might generate in other areas. Thus, again the union
did not or could not devote its full energies to a battle in which community
groups had taken the lead. The second reason the program proceeded is
that most New Haven residents in need of decent jobs are not in a position
to oppose free training. This is particularly important in understanding the
intricacies and nuances of indigenous community politics-in this case, the
black community. While civil rights and community groups worried over
the nature of the training program, residents in need of change did not
believe they had the luxury to fight for something better this time. They
were willing to enroll in any training program if securing a job was the
possible end result.
This particular struggle may not be deemed a victory, but it did have
important implications for the potential of labor/community alliances.
First, as with the bus issue, this struggle siphoned both time and energy
from Omni officials. As they sought to address the issue of the job-training
program, union officials were able to plan and implement their offense
around the neutrality agreement. Second, this encounter highlighted the
flexibility, yet limited the power, community groups bring to an issue
compared to unions. In this case, because of the union's need for ties with
local officials in what they considered the more important goal of securing
a neutrality agreement, the training program supported by the local black
77. Id.
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conservatives was implemented.7 However, it was the position of civil
rights groups and community activists as outside agitators that allowed
them to engage Omni management and their allies more aggressively. If
labor/community alliances can more effectively use the differing positions
and statuses of these coalition partners, they can plan and implement a
more comprehensive struggle against management.
The final battle which served as the central focus of the Omni struggle
was the issue of the neutrality agreement. The conflict over neutrality
seemed to be resolved when Cordish agreed to honor such an agreement.
Once he sold the hotel to the Omni, however, the battle was renewed. At
first, the Omni publicly signaled its respect for the "strong unions" at Yale
and agreed to the concept of neutrality. As time passed, the Omni retreated
from this initial public position. In a July 3, 1997 meeting, the first of three
lawyers to represent the Omni in negotiations with the union declared that
he did not like the neutrality agreement and wanted instead to institute an
election to determine union representation. In response to this position,
community activists again came to the aid of the union.
As noted earlier, the New Haven Community and Labor Coalition was
formed during the successful living wage campaign in 1996-97. It was
established to institutionalize the type of labor/community alliance that had
been so successful in the unions' 1996 contract fight with Yale. The
Coalition decided to meet regularly as issues relevant to their work arose,
so when the issue of the neutrality agreement emerged, they were in a
strong position to "persuade" the Omni to honor the neutrality agreement
not just in principle, but in fact. While different members of the Coalition
had participated in the other struggles, Andrea Cole, with the resources of
the union at her disposal, was able to mobilize the entire alliance into a
visible and impressive show of force against the Omni with regards to the
neutrality agreement. The groups involved in this effort included the
NAACP, the New Haven Clergy Association, the Elm City Congregations
Organized (ECCO), and the Student Labor Action Coalition (SLAC).
These groups employed tactics ranging from letters to boycotts to picket
lines. In fact, from the time the hotel opened in January 1998 until a
settlement was reached in April, picket lines in front of the Omni became a
regular fixture, with different groups assigned different days to coordinate
the protests.
The labor/community alliance exerted its power not only by visibly
demonstrating in front of the hotel, but also by putting pressure on the other
stakeholders who were instrumental to the Omni's future. For example, in
October 1997, New Haven Mayor John DeStefano, Jr. changed the location
of his annual Columbus Day dinner, moving it out of the new Omni Hotel
78. See Cole, supra note 41.
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ballroom to the Yale Commons dining facility.79 Pressured by the
Coalition, although he said he felt "no pressure whatsoever," DeStefano
sent a strong signal to the Omni to compromise on a neutrality agreement. 80
In defense of its position, the Omni placed a full-page ad in the New Haven
Register declaring that the "Omni Hotel is working hard to resolve all of
the concerns of our community."81 Luckily for the union, the ad did not
curb the activity of community activists. Numerous groups like the New
Haven Clergy Association continued to schedule meetings with Omni
management asking them to enact the neutrality agreement. Furthermore,
in December, several people representing the many organizations included
in the Coalition testified at a Board of Alders hearing about the
ramifications of the Omni's refusal to honor the neutrality agreement. The
committee that sponsored the hearing subsequently passed a resolution
urging the Omni to agree to neutrality.
January 12, 1998 marked the Omni's pre-grand opening, and
punctuating the event were the picketers outside. Despite the opening of
the hotel, efforts to disrupt the daily work of the Omni would not only
continue but would intensify. For example, 2,000 postcards signed by
members of the New Haven community were sent to Linda Libby, the
General Manager of the Omni, ordering the hotel to meet the demands of
the union and community. The ECCO organized a meeting of over 200
clergy and laity with Libby as well. Two Yale student organizations, the
Student Labor Action Coalition and the Social Justice Network, held
weekly protests in front of the Omni. Additionally, several groups,
including Planned Parenthood, canceled their events at the hotel. On
March 28, the Governor of Puerto Rico was scheduled to give the keynote
address at a conference sponsored by Yale Law School addressing the
status of Puerto Rico. The Governor, however, refused to cross the picket
line in front of the Omni and forced the Dean of the school, Anthony
Kronman, to move the keynote speech to the law school auditorium. 2 The
last straw seemed to come when the ECCO, with the support of the unions,
students, community members, and civil rights groups, called for a full-
fledged boycott of the Omni to start on April 15 if the neutrality agreement
was not in place.83
On April 14, after an eight-month fight with the coalition of labor and
79. See Mark Zaretsky, Mayor Yanks Omni Dinner, Backs Unions, NEw HAVEN REG.
ONLINE (Oct. 8, 1997) <http://www.ctcentral.com>.
80. Id.
81. David McClendon, Omni Hotel Counters Barb, NEw HAVEN REG. ONLINE (Oct. 17,
1997) <http://www.ctcentral.com.>.
82. See Jeff Herzog, Omni Labor Dispute Prompts Speech Move, YALE DAILY NEWS
ONLINE (Mar. 30, 1998) <http://www.yaledailynews.com>.
83. See Mark Zaretsky, Church Coalition Threatens Omni Hotel with Boycott, NEW
HAvEN REG. ONLINE (Mar. 7, 1998) <http://www.ctcentral.com>.
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community groups and with a threatened boycott looming, the Omni and
union leaders settled. With help from the mayor and Yale University
officials, Omni management and union leaders reached an accord that
included the desired neutrality agreement as well as a no strike/no lockout
provision. In turn, Local 217 promised to limit their organizing drive to
inside the hotel. Heyman noted that the Omni probably regretted having
the mayor of New Haven and representatives from Yale present as they
negotiated the terms of the settlement.84 He stated, "[tihey didn't negotiate
the kind of agreement they would have had Yale and the mayor not been in
the room.1
85
This victory would not have been possible without the coalition of
community and civil rights groups willing to act on behalf of the locals.
More specifically, according to Heyman, this alliance would not have
succeeded without their point person, Andrea Cole. 86 She provided a level
of coordination rarely found in ad hoe coalitions. It was her persistent
work with the community, civil rights, and religious organizations that
proved to be so crucial in the union's struggles with the Omni. "The ECCO
picket line was turned out by Andrea," said Heyman. 7 Cole, however,
disagrees. While she acknowledges that she kept in daily contact with
ECCO lead organizer Pat Spear, she argues that ECCO did a remarkable
job of turning out its own members.8 Furthermore, according to Cole, the
ECCO is the only community organization in the Coalition that
consistently turns out its people.8 9 This is one example of the problem of
holding community organizations accountable in coalitions and alliances,
especially when the major resource to be gained from working with such
groups is people.
This model of community mobilization around union efforts embodied
in the Omni struggle in New Haven is not unique, but is instead part of a
national trend, especially as it is developing in the AFL-CIO initiative
called Union Cities. The initiative is described as follows:
The ultimate goal of Union Cities is to build the capacity to
involve the entire community in the effort to stand up to
employers that violate workers' rights to organize and hold
politicians accountable to working families. 90
Obviously the relationships required for these models to work take a long
84. See Heyman, supra note 43.
85. Id.; see also Cole, supra note 49. In fact, had the mayor and Yale not been present,
the agreement probably would have been weaker.
86. See Heyman, supra note 43.
87. Id.
88. See Cole, supra note 49.
89. See id.
90. CoMMuNrms ATWORK, supra note 1; Chavez-Thompson, supra note 1.
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time to build. In the New Haven case, Cole had been known for her
activism in the anti-Apartheid movement since the early 1980s. What
started originally as a "one-woman campaign" became an institutionalized
strategy of the unions. Recognizing the importance of community
mobilization, the H.E.R.E. Alliance is now committed to employing
someone who builds and sustains relationships with community and civil
rights organizations. But how broad and strong are these alliances? When
union jobs or wages are not at stake, are the unions willing to devote
resources and use their power to stop economic operations and production
to support the political work of local community groups?
In the case of New Haven, the answer is unclear. Unequivocally, Cole
enhances not only the work of the union, but also the effectiveness of the
community groups with whom she works. However, as the union demands
that she spread her energies between New Haven, Bridgeport, Hartford, and
other cities in Connecticut, can she alone foster the types of continuous
personal interactions that can sustain these coalitions? Or will the
community be involved only when there is a new union battle on the
horizon? The answers to these questions remain to be seen.
I. CONCLUSION: LESSONS LEARNED-PoSSIBILfES FOR ALLIANCES IN
NEW HAVEN AND ELSEWHERE
At the same time that the victories of the labor/community alliance in
New Haven are celebrated, the struggle over the bus routes near the Omni
must be remembered. In this instance, community and civil rights groups
pressured the city to reverse the promise that they, and the unions who also
signed the original agreement, made to Cordish to reroute the bus lines.
While a compromise concerning the bus routes was reached between the
city and hotel officials in October 1997,9' noticeably absent from the
activity around this struggle were Locals 217, 34, and 35. Union leadership
decided not to participate actively in this struggle because the H.E.R.E.
Alliance made a decision that they could not fight on all fronts, and wanted
to focus their attention on the job-training issue and the neutrality
agreement.
If we return to the concerns of labor scholars discussed earlier in the
paper regarding labor/community coalitions, one finds many of the issues
noted exemplified in the Omni struggle. Most problematic was the union's
wavering commitment to the community's struggles. As Cole noted, she
felt increasingly uncomfortable returning to community activists only when
it was time to renegotiate a contract. The good news, of course, is that the
H.E.R.E. Alliance took steps to correct this difficulty by hiring Cole full
91. See Itano, supra note 67.
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time as the community liaison. Even with Cole, however, the union made
decisions about when to participate which did not always optimally serve
community organizations. Further, the struggle over the job-training
program shows how the union also made decisions about the form and
content of their intervention, making a conscious "political decision" to
concentrate their efforts on the neutrality agreement at the expense of a
protracted struggle for a skills-based program. Both instances point to the
asymmetrical relationship that can develop in even the most principled
labor/community alliances. Without some type of governing board,
involving all the members of the coalition and independent of its strongest
members (like unions), the continued reciprocity needed to sustain such
coalitions will always be an issue.
Closely aligned with the concern over an asymmetrical relationship in
the labor/community alliance is the concern over the inability of
community and civil rights groups to hold unions accountable. Are
community leaders really willing to turn their back on the union when they
come calling at contract time? Much like the relationship between African-
Americans and the Democratic Party, supporting an inattentive union may
be the lesser of two evils for community members when the other option
involves losing union jobs and benefits. Of course, community members
can hold unions accountable by withdrawing their support when the union
calls for action.
However, there is an alternative form of accountability. Specifically,
civil rights and other community organizations must mobilize their own
base, particularly that part of their membership who are also union
members, if they are to attain some realistic level of accountability.
Similar to the union's recognition that people are not just workers, but
individuals enmeshed in communities, community groups must also see
their members as workers. Overlapping membership may provide an
avenue into the union, where questions of accountability and trust can be
resolved. This, of course, will not be an easy task since one of the
difficulties Cole reports is the inability of many community groups to
92mobilize their members. However, some thought must be given to
institutionalizing mechanisms of accountability that run in both directions.
Finally, while in the last few pages we have raised a few concerns that
must be addressed when considering labor/community alliances,
fundamentally these entities hold great promise. It is clear from the New
Haven case that community and civil rights activism was essential to the
numerous struggles that were waged against the Omni, especially the fight
for a neutrality agreement. However, the future of the Coalition, as it seeks
to move into non-employment based issues, will be the real test of its
92. See Cole, supra note 41.
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sustainability. Already the New Haven Community and Labor Alliance is
meeting about future union campaigns including an organizing drive with
Local 1199 to unionize hospital and nursing home workers. Other issues of
concern to New Haven workers include the failing public education system,
continued police brutality and harassment, and the lack of economic
opportunities available to New Haven's poorest residents. What will the
union do on these issues? These issues appear to be the test of whether the
labor/community alliance in New Haven is prepared to be the basis for
long-term systemic change, or a needed and very valuable support unit for
the local unions when employment issues emerge. We hope for the sake of
New Haven that the former agenda comes to take hold with a
labor/community alliance serving as the centerpiece for a new social
movement of marginal communities.
